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NOTES
In view of the court's repeated acknowledgment of the principle
of state ownership of beds and navigable waters in the Miami
Corporation decision, and further in view of the invocation of the
same principle in the above quotation with reference to the very
act under which the successful litigant in the Humble Oil Com-
pany case claimed title, it is surprising that the conclusion reached
in the instant case was so "perfectly apparent. '27 It is submitted,
therefore, that a re-examination of that conclusion is warranted
in future cases involving the question of private title to beds of
navigable waters.
Mary Ellen Caldwell
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-DUPLICITY
The defendant had committed two batteries in connection
with a single affray. He had been tried and convicted of one
of the batteries and entered a plea of former jeopardy when
brought to trial for the second. Held, the plea of former jeopardy
could not be maintained as the defendant had committed dis-
tinct batteries on two individuals. The batteries were separate
offenses regardless of the fact that they were closely connected
in point of time and were accomplished by defendant while
engaged in one unlawful transaction. State v. Ysasi, 222 La. 902,
64 So. 2d 213 (1953).
The Ysasi decision clearly enunciates the proposition that
two criminal offenses are not to be considered as one crime
because they result from a single unlawful transaction. The
majority of the common law authorities take the same position
and hold that if two or more persons are injured by several shots
or blows the offender may be prosecuted for each as a distinct
crime. Thus, where several shots are fired in rapid succession
killing more than one person, indictments will lie for each kill-
ing.1 The same rationale is applied in cases where the defendant
them with that character." See note 12 supra for other statutes purport-
ing to alienate beds of navigable waters after they become dry.
27. 223 La. 47, 64 So. 2d 839, 840 (1953).
1. State v. Taylor, 138 Kan. 407, 26 P. 2d 598 (1933); Slone v. Common-
wealth, 266 Ky. 366, 99 S.W. 2d 207 (1936); State v. Coolack, 17 N.J. Super.
192, 85 A. 2d 353 (1951); State v. Billot, 104 Ohio St. 13, 135 N.E. 285 (1922).
In State v. Singleton, 66 Ariz. 49, 182 P. 2d 920 (1947), the court stated: "As
to the contradiction that the defendant claims is Inherent in the verdicts,
we find it to be the settled majority rule of law that although several shots
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holds at gun point several victims while taking property from
each. 2 However, a contrary view obtains in a few jurisdictions
where a confusing test dependent upon the intent of the accused
is applied3
Although not presented by a plea of double jeopardy, the
same controlling question of whether one or two crimes had
been committed was raised and confusingly treated in State v.
Morrison.4 In the Morrison case a mother was killed with an
axe after she had apprehended the three defendants entering
her home for the purpose of robbery. Subsequently, the woman's
small daughter was shot for fear she had recognized one of the
offenders. The defendants were charged with the killing of both
mother and daughter in a single count of the indictment. Article
220 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits, as
duplicity, the charging of more than one crime in a count of an
indictment.5 In considering an objection to the indictment on
this ground, the court quoted from State v. Batson6 to the effect
that although a criminal act may operate on more than one
person, it may still be charged as one offense provided it be but
one act, consummated at one time.7 The troublesome factor in
the holding was the court's treatment of the axe killing of the
mother and the shooting of the little girl as a single criminal
be fired in such rapid succession that they constitute, in effect, but one
act, still, the result may involve more than one offense so that an acquittal
on a trial for killing one will not prevent prosecution for killing another.
The offenses though occurring almost simultaneously in point of time are
rendered distinct and severable by a plurality of shots and subjects."
2. Thompson v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. 222, 234 S.W. 400 (1921); Keeton v.
Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 522, 18 S.W. 359 (1892).
3. In Cook v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 182, 63 S.W. 872 (1901), two shots were
fired wounding A and causing the death of B. The defendant was acquitted
of assault with intent to murder A and subsequently convicted of murder-
ing B. Defendant claimed both shots were fired at A, while the prosecution
maintained that one shot was fired at B. The court held it to be a ques-
tion of fact and if the jury found defendant's volition and intent were
directed toward A only, then he could not be convicted upon an act, intent,
and volition for which he had previously been acquitted.
4. 184 La. 39, 165 So. 323 (1935).
5. Art. 220, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15,:220: except
as otherwise provided in this part, it is duplicity to include in the same
count two separate and distinct offenses."
6. 108 La. 479, 32 So. 478 (1902).
7. "Though a criminal act may operate on more than one person or
thing, nevertheless, if it be but one act, consummated at one time, it may
be charged as one offense, and an indictment charging in one count the
murder of six persons is not bad for duplicity unless it appears upon its
face that the deaths resulted from two or more distinct acts. But if, upon
the trial, it is shown that all the deaths did not result from the same act,
the accused may then compel the state to elect upon which charge it will
proceed."
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act. The force of the holding was weakened by the fact that an
objection of this type must be urged before the jury is sworn
and the defendants were not timely in so doing." However,
the conclusion that the court actually treated the two killings as
one crime is definitely strengthened by Chief Justice O'Niell's
concluding statement that the court found it unnecessary to
consider at what time, if any, the objection to the indictment
should have been made.
A careful consideration of the issue dealt with by the court
in the Batson case leaves one with the opinion that the language
quoted does not support the position taken in the Morrison case.
In the Batson decision the validity of an indictment containing
in one count a charge of murdering six persons was sustained.
The court did not consider the facts of the case but merely
stated that there was nothing on the face of the indictment to
indicate that the persons named had not been killed at the same
instant and by the same act. It further added that if testimony
showed the killing of two persons was not by the same act, the
defendant had the right to compel the state to elect the charge
upon which it would proceed. It appears that the court drew a
clear distinction between the murder of several persons by a
single act and two murders accomplished by two distinct and
separate acts. The court in the Batson case was referring to the
former situation while the facts of the Morrison case were those
of the latter.
State v. Ysasi, therefore, appears to dispel completely any
confusion which may have resulted from the Morrison decision
and places this phase of Louisiana criminal jurisprudence on a
firm and logical foundation. Henceforth, there should be no
basis for the contention that two separate and distinct criminal
acts should be treated as one offense because they arose from
a single illicit transaction. This should be true whether the case
presents a question of double jeopardy or a question of duplicity.
Neilson Jacobs
8. Art. 221, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:221:
"The objection of duplicity cannot be urged after the jury has been sworn,
and must be set up either by demurrer or by a motion to quash the indict-
ment."
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